What Should We Do?
Munich, 1919: Max Weber asks how we can remain true to our convictions without relinquishing responsibility for their consequences.
Max Weber – Munich, 1919
On the evening of January 28, 1919, nearly a hundred people gather in a narrow room at the Steinicke bookshop in Munich to hear a lecture by Max Weber. Among them is the writer Ricarda Huch. As one participant later recalls, Weber speaks without a prepared text, only occasionally consulting his notes. The subject of the evening is Politics as a Vocation.[1]
It is an unusual time to talk about politics. Germany has lost the World War, the Kaiser has been deposed, and less than three months earlier the monarchy in Munich was overthrown. The socialist Kurt Eisner governs Bavaria, while supporters of parliamentary democracy and revolutionary movements struggle over the country's future. Two weeks earlier, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were murdered in Berlin.
Weber, 54 years old and one of Germany's most respected social scientists, has himself become involved in these struggles. He calls for democratic reforms, delivers political speeches, and campaigns for the newly founded German Democratic Party. His own attempt to win a seat in the National Assembly has just failed. When the Independent Students' Association asks him to give a lecture on politics, he initially wants to decline.[2]
Among his listeners are young people who, after four years of war, have no desire simply to return to the old order. Some hope for a fundamental transformation of society. Weber knows this generation from numerous conversations. He admires their idealism, but also fears that their enthusiasm might blind them to political realities.
What can he say to these young people, who want not merely to imagine a better world but to bring it into being? To understand his answer, we must return to another lecture Weber gave at the same venue a little more than a year earlier. On that occasion, he had spoken not about politics but about science, and about a question that reached far beyond the lecture hall.
The Disenchanted World
On November 7, 1917, the war is still raging when Weber addresses the Independent Students' Association on Science as a Vocation.[3] His young listeners want to know what it means to devote one's life to science. Weber begins with a rather sobering answer. An academic career is uncertain, scientific work demands ever greater specialization, and even important discoveries have no prospect of lasting forever. A scholar must almost hope that his findings will one day be superseded. For that is what scientific progress consists of.
But where does this progress actually lead? To explain the problem, Weber turns to an everyday example: the streetcar.
Someone boarding a streetcar generally has no idea how its motor works. Yet he can reasonably expect it to carry him to his destination. Modern people, then, do not fully understand the technical processes that surround them. Often they know remarkably little about them. But they live with the conviction that these processes can, in principle, be explained. Given enough time and knowledge, one could discover why the streetcar moves, how electricity is generated, or why a disease develops.
This distinguishes their world from one in which mysterious powers are believed to lie behind events, powers whose behavior cannot be calculated. Modern science has increasingly displaced such beliefs. Not because everyone now understands everything, but because people can assume that the world is, in principle, intelligible. Weber calls this centuries-long process the "disenchantment of the world."[4]
This is an enormous achievement. Science and technology enable people to treat diseases, overcome distances, and transform their surroundings on a scale that earlier generations could scarcely have imagined. Yet Weber asks whether this progress amounts to anything more than an ever-growing capacity to control the world. Does it also make people wiser about how they should live?
The Russian writer Leo Tolstoy had expressed this difficulty with particular force. Science, he argued, cannot answer the question that ultimately matters: "What should we do? How should we live?"
Weber takes this objection seriously. Perhaps the problem with modern science is precisely that it can explain more and more without thereby telling us what gives our lives meaning.
The Battle of the Gods
Consider a doctor treating a seriously ill patient. Medicine can investigate which treatments might prolong the patient's life and relieve his suffering. It can compare the chances of success of different interventions. But can it also prove scientifically that life should be prolonged under all circumstances, even when the patient is suffering terribly?
Medicine presupposes certain goals, such as preserving life and reducing suffering. Whether these goals should take precedence in a particular case, however, cannot be decided by medical research alone. Science can establish what consequences an action is likely to have. But it cannot derive from its own findings which goals we should ultimately pursue.
This is not true of medicine alone. An economist can investigate which policies increase prosperity. That does not settle how prosperity ought to be distributed. A historian can explain how a war began. It does not automatically follow whether a particular military action was morally justified.
The difficulty becomes greater still because our values are by no means always compatible. Peace and justice can make conflicting demands. Someone who refuses to answer an attack with violence may wish to preserve peace while at the same time endangering the freedom of those under attack. Loyalty to a conviction can come into conflict with responsibility toward other people.
Weber compares these competing values to the gods of antiquity. In earlier times, people made sacrifices to different deities whose demands were not always compatible. In the modern world, the gods have not simply disappeared. Stripped of their religious form, they have returned as impersonal values. And they are still at war with one another.
One might hope that science will someday settle this dispute. But Weber considers precisely that impossible. No scientific experiment can prove whether truth, freedom, justice, or religious faith possesses the highest value in any ultimate sense. Research can examine our convictions, reveal their assumptions, and expose their contradictions. But it cannot decide on our behalf which god we should serve.
Does this mean that science is ultimately meaningless for our lives? Weber draws a different conclusion. Precisely because it cannot make our decisions for us, it has an important task: it can help us achieve clarity.
A good scholar, Weber explains, must teach his students to acknowledge even those facts that contradict their own political convictions. He can show which means would be necessary to achieve particular goals, what consequences might follow, and which values might thereby be compromised. He can help people understand the meaning of their own actions.[5]
What he must not do is confuse his scientific authority with moral or political authority. A professor should not become a prophet, telling students what they must live for.
For Weber, this is no demand for political indifference. Only two days before his lecture on science, he had himself delivered an impassioned speech in Munich against the war aims of the Pan-German nationalists. As a politically engaged citizen, he takes a position. As a scholar, he insists on distinguishing between knowledge and personal conviction.
Yet Tolstoy's question remains. If science cannot tell us what we should do, then we must evidently decide for ourselves. And that decision becomes particularly difficult once we attempt to put our convictions into political practice.
A Generation Wants to Act
On November 7, 1918, exactly one year after Weber's lecture on science, the monarchy in Munich falls. Kurt Eisner proclaims the Free State of Bavaria. What had been a question about a better society has suddenly become the practical task of creating a new political order.
Among the young people swept up in these events is Ernst Toller. The 25-year-old writer has experienced the war as a soldier and become a committed pacifist. In October 1917, he had met Weber at a cultural gathering at Lauenstein Castle. He later studied in Heidelberg and attended the Sunday discussions held at the Weber home.
Toller admires the older scholar. He is particularly impressed by his intellectual integrity. Weber, in turn, recognizes the sincerity of Toller's convictions, but regards his political ideas as dangerously detached from reality. When Toller establishes a movement of young pacifists and socialists, Weber refuses the support he has been asked to give.[6]
The contrast between them is characteristic of the time. Toller and many of his friends have emerged from the war convinced that a society capable of producing such a catastrophe must be fundamentally transformed. They dream of a peaceful community of free human beings. Weber shares their contempt for the old political leadership in certain respects, but doubts that the contradictions of social life can simply be abolished through revolution.
When Weber speaks again in Munich in January 1919, this conflict is therefore far more than a philosophical question. What happens when people who want to create a more just society actually assume political power?
Weber begins with a sober definition of what distinguishes politics from other activities. For him, politics means striving for power or seeking to influence its distribution. The modern state, in turn, is the institution that successfully claims the exclusive right to determine the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.[7]
This does not, of course, mean that a state rests exclusively on violence. It requires administrations, laws, institutions, and the recognition of its citizens. But behind its decisions lies, ultimately, the possibility of enforcing them through coercion when necessary.
For Weber, this is where the particular difficulty of politics begins. Anyone wishing to establish a new order must know more than what that order should look like. He must organize people, overcome resistance, exercise power, and possibly use force. And he must reckon with the fact that other people do not share his goals.
Even the most sincere convictions cannot spare him from decisions that involve something morally troubling.
The Responsibility of the Convinced
Imagine a revolutionary movement that wants to create a society free from violence and oppression. Its supporters are convinced that the existing order is unjust. But what should they do if those who previously held power defend their privileges? May they use violence to make a future without violence possible?
For Weber, this reveals a fundamental problem of political action. There is no necessary connection between the moral rightness of a goal and the actual consequences of the means used to achieve it.
To explain this difficulty, he distinguishes between two ethical attitudes: the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility.
Someone guided by an ethic of conviction acts out of loyalty to a belief regarded as unconditionally valid. He wants to do what is right, even if undesirable consequences follow. Someone guided by an ethic of responsibility, by contrast, must include the foreseeable consequences of his actions in his moral judgment. He cannot simply appeal to his good intentions if his actions have caused harm.
At first, this might seem like a straightforward contrast between idealistic dreamers and sober realists. But Weber is concerned with a more difficult problem. After all, even someone who carefully weighs every consequence of his actions may find himself in a situation where every possible course of action is morally questionable.
A politician who refrains from violence might thereby allow other people to be oppressed. Someone who uses violence to end that oppression, on the other hand, risks causing suffering, injustice, and the emergence of new forms of domination. For which of these consequences does he bear responsibility?
Weber regards it as a dangerous illusion to assume that good intentions must necessarily produce good results. History offers enough examples of people who acted in the name of lofty ideals and achieved the very opposite of what they originally intended.
But does this make the ethic of responsibility superior to the ethic of conviction? Not necessarily. For a politics concerned only with expected outcomes could eventually justify almost any means by appealing to a supposedly good end. Even the unscrupulous politician often claims that his actions were necessary to prevent something worse.
Weber is aware of this danger. That is why, toward the end of his lecture, he explicitly declares that the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility must complement one another. A politician needs convictions to which he is passionately committed. Without them, politics would become a mere technique for acquiring power. But he also needs the ability to perceive reality, even when it contradicts his hopes.[8]
From this, Weber derives three essential qualities of the politician: passion, a sense of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. Passion gives him a cause to which he can devote himself. Responsibility compels him to take the consequences of his actions seriously. A sense of proportion enables him to regard reality with a certain inner distance, even when it comes to his own desires.
The difficulty lies in combining these qualities. Someone who calculates everything with perfect detachment may never find the courage to change anything. Someone who allows himself to be carried away entirely by enthusiasm, on the other hand, may lose sight of the very people his politics is supposed to serve.
At this point, the two Munich lectures meet. The scholar must be prepared to acknowledge facts that shake his convictions. The politician must be prepared to acknowledge consequences that call his intentions into question. Both need devotion to a cause, but that very devotion must not prevent them from seeing reality.
The Professor and the Revolutionary
A few months after Weber's lecture on politics, this distinction acquires a remarkably concrete significance.
On February 21, 1919, Kurt Eisner is assassinated in Munich. The political situation becomes increasingly radicalized. In April, revolutionaries proclaim the Munich Soviet Republic. Ernst Toller is among its leading figures. As the confrontations turn violent, the committed pacifist finds himself taking command of a unit of the Red Army and participating in armed fighting.
The Soviet Republic is crushed by government troops and Freikorps units in early May. Serious acts of violence follow. Toller is arrested and charged with high treason. In July 1919, he stands trial.
A witness then appears whom, given the political differences involved, one might not necessarily have expected: Max Weber.
Weber has firmly opposed Toller's revolutionary politics. Yet he knows the young man and is willing to testify on his behalf. In court, he carefully distinguishes between Toller's personal character and his political abilities. A contemporary newspaper report summarizes his assessment in a remarkable phrase: "Absolute sincerity of intentions, coupled with extraordinary unworldliness and ignorance of political and economic realities."[9]
In Weber's judgment, Toller acted out of genuine conviction. But the sincerity of his intentions does not mean that he adequately understood the political consequences of his actions.
One could see this as a retrospective confirmation of the warning Weber had given the revolutionary students only a few months earlier. But the scene reveals something else as well. The professor who had warned so emphatically against the dangers of a politics guided by conviction alone is nevertheless willing to stand up for a political opponent. He does not allow his criticism of Toller's actions to become a blanket judgment of the man himself. Toller is ultimately sentenced to five years of fortress detention.
In both of his Munich lectures, Weber had spoken about people who wanted to devote their lives to a cause. To the young scholars, he explained why understanding the world could not provide them with a final answer to the question of how to live. To aspiring politicians, he showed why even the certainty of fighting for a just cause does not relieve them of responsibility for their actions.
Weber demanded neither the abandonment of convictions nor the subordination of every ideal to what was politically feasible. On the contrary: at the end of Politics as a Vocation, he reminds his listeners that, throughout history, what was possible has often been achieved only because people repeatedly reached for the impossible. Politics, he writes, means "a forceful, slow drilling through hard boards, with passion and a sense of proportion at the same time."[10]
But anyone who wants to achieve the impossible must engage with the world as it really is, not merely with the world as he wishes it to be.
What, then, should we do? Science can help us understand the consequences of our decisions. But it cannot free us from the need to decide. And even when we act out of the deepest conviction, we cannot absolve ourselves of responsibility for the consequences.
Perhaps this is the most demanding insight Weber left his listeners: that we serve our convictions most seriously precisely when we are willing to acknowledge what speaks against them.