Justice or Power?
In 1971, two of the most important intellectuals of their time met to discuss human nature. It turned out to be an extraordinary exchange in which, as Edward Said remarked, neither the moderator "nor his two guests appeared to be talking about the same thing, most of the time."[1]
Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault – Eindhoven, October 1971
The foyer of the auditorium is packed. Television cameras are rolling. On October 22, 1971, two men sit facing each other in the auditorium of the Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands. They would seem to have plenty in common. Both are critical of existing power structures. Both are interested in the rules that govern human thought. And both are already among the most influential intellectuals of their generation.
One is Noam Chomsky, 42, an American linguist and outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War. The other is Michel Foucault, 45, a French philosopher and historian known for his studies of madness, science, and the changing orders of knowledge. The moderator, Fons Elders, compares them to two men digging a tunnel through the same mountain from opposite sides. They use different tools and have no way of knowing whether their tunnels will ever meet.
The question that has brought them together could hardly be more fundamental: Is there such a thing as human nature? Are human beings born with certain abilities and needs, or is even what we take to be their essential nature shaped by history?
The Hidden Order of Language
To understand what brings Chomsky to Eindhoven, we must first consider a seemingly ordinary phenomenon: a child learning to speak. A child can form sentences it has never heard before: "Tomorrow the dog will tell the moon a story." Even someone hearing this sentence for the first time understands it without difficulty. A child does not merely memorize ready-made sentences. It learns to produce an unlimited number of new sentences from a limited number of words. But how does it manage this without reading grammar books or receiving systematic instruction?
For a long time, behaviorism had been influential in American psychology. It sought to explain human behavior primarily through experience, imitation, and reinforcement. Applied to language, this meant, in simplified terms, that children hear words, repeat them, and learn from the reactions of those around them. Chomsky considered this explanation insufficient. Children do not simply imitate what they hear. They also form sentences according to rules no one has explained to them, sometimes making remarkably inventive mistakes in the process. A child who says "I goed" instead of "I went" is not repeating something it has heard. It is applying a rule it has apparently worked out for itself.
In Syntactic Structures (1957) and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), Chomsky developed the argument that children must be born with certain capacities for acquiring language. They do not yet know any particular language, but they possess abilities that make language acquisition possible in the first place. Chomsky called this universal grammar.
His most striking idea was that rules do not make creativity impossible. On the contrary, they make it possible. Consider chess. Because the pieces move according to fixed rules, countless different games can be played. Without those rules, there would be nothing but the arbitrary movement of wooden pieces. Similarly, it is precisely the structure of language that allows human beings to produce sentences no one has ever spoken before.
Chomsky suspects that something more is involved here than a special talent for grammar. Perhaps it is part of human nature to want to create, to think independently, and to develop one's abilities. For him, this is not a proven political theory. There is a considerable distance between a grammatical capacity and a moral right to freedom, and Chomsky is aware of it. Nevertheless, his theory of language lends plausibility to an idea that also concerns him politically: human beings are not merely creatures that respond to commands. They can produce something of their own initiative. What would a society look like that did justice to such abilities?
The History of Truth
Foucault would already have objections to the way this question is framed. In History of Madness (1961), he had examined how the treatment of people considered mad had changed over time. Today, it seems self-evident that mental illnesses should be described and treated medically. Yet what counted as madness, how it was distinguished from reason, and who was entitled to make that distinction have not remained the same throughout history. Foucault was therefore interested not only in what people in earlier periods knew about madness. He asked how madness had come to be an object of medical knowledge in the first place. What institutions had been involved? What conceptions of reason had to be taken for granted?
The fact that psychiatry emerged historically does not, of course, mean that people did not suffer in earlier times or that mental illnesses are merely inventions. Foucault's attention is directed elsewhere: towards the ways societies organize experience and turn it into an object of scientific knowledge. His history is therefore also a history of those who are recognized as reasonable, and of those who are denied that recognition. In books such as The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and The Order of Things (1966), he extended this approach to medicine and science. Every period, he argued, has certain conditions that determine which questions can be asked and which answers can be accepted as knowledge. To the people living within them, these conditions usually seem so obvious that they hardly notice them.
There is a surprising similarity here to Chomsky: Foucault, too, is searching for hidden rules of thought. But while Chomsky is interested in the innate capacities of the mind, Foucault investigates historically formed orders of knowledge. This has consequences that extend far beyond the history of science. If the concepts available in a given period shape what it can know, then even the researcher searching for eternal truths may be influenced by the assumptions of their time. Why should "human nature," of all things, stand outside this history? Perhaps the term describes not a timeless essence but the way a particular age conceives of humanity.
Two Sides of the Same Mountain
In Eindhoven, Foucault is the first to answer Elders's question. He doubts that "human nature" refers to a clearly established scientific discovery. The concept may instead serve as a tool with which researchers define their field of inquiry.
Chomsky, then, wants to discover which characteristics the human mind actually possesses, what human nature itself consists of. Foucault, by contrast, is interested in how a science comes to investigate such characteristics in the first place. The two men use the same words but ask different questions. It is as though one were studying the rules that enable all human beings to learn chess, while the other wanted to understand why a particular age considered this game worth playing. Both are investigating rules, but that does not mean they are asking the same question.
The conversation then turns to creativity. For Chomsky, forming a sentence that has never been heard before is one of the ordinary creative achievements of human beings. Foucault, by contrast, initially thinks of scientists who produce new knowledge within a historical order. At this point, however, the two speakers begin to find common ground. Chomsky's child can form new sentences because it has mastered the rules of language. A scientist can develop a new theory because they work within a particular field of concepts and problems. In both cases, something new emerges not in the absence of rules, but because rules make it possible.
Perhaps, Chomsky suggests, their perspectives even complement one another. To understand a discovery, we would need to consider both the capacities of the human mind and the historical circumstances in which it operates. A rapprochement now seems entirely possible; the two tunnel diggers might yet meet. But then Elders turns the conversation towards politics, and what had been a cautious agreement about creativity develops into a fundamental dispute.
What Does a Liberated Human Being Look Like?
The debate takes place in the autumn of 1971. The Vietnam War is still raging, and the protests of recent years have transformed Europe and America. For Chomsky, politics is no mere theoretical concern. He is among the best-known American opponents of the war and considers himself a libertarian socialist. In his view, people should be able to determine their own lives as freely as possible and make decisions about their common affairs together. A factory in which every decision is handed down from above is problematic from this perspective not only because workers might be poorly paid. It also deprives them of the opportunity to shape their work collectively.
Foucault, too, is politically active. Only a few months earlier, he had helped establish a group that gathered information about conditions in French prisons. In Eindhoven, he emphasizes that power is exercised not only by governments or police forces. It also operates through universities, hospitals, and psychiatric institutions: places that produce knowledge, classify people, and determine what counts as normal. A university, for example, does not simply impart knowledge. It also decides which forms of knowledge are recognized, who is allowed to participate, and which qualifications carry social weight. For Foucault, such institutions are therefore not merely settings in which politics takes place; they are themselves sites of political struggle. When Elders asks him why he is interested in politics at all, Foucault promptly turns the question around: surely we should be asking why anyone would not be interested in politics. The audience laughs.
However different their views of power may be, the two men largely agree in their opposition to oppression. But what would liberation actually aim to achieve? Chomsky hopes for a society in which the creative capacities of human beings are no longer restricted by domination and coercion. Foucault, on the other hand, distrusts the notion of a "true human being" who needs only to be freed from the constraints imposed by society. After all, even socialist movements that sought to create an entirely new order had often retained old bourgeois assumptions about family, sexuality, and ways of life. A revolution could therefore transform political conditions without breaking free of the thinking of the old society. Who can guarantee that our image of a liberated human being is not itself still a product of the very society we wish to overcome?
Foucault thus confronts Chomsky's political ideal with the same difficulty he had already identified in the concept of human nature. Perhaps our ideas of freedom and justice are not nearly as self-evident or universal as we believe. Perhaps they are precisely what we must question if we genuinely want to change existing conditions.
Is It Right to Break the Law?
The dispute takes on a sharper edge when Chomsky begins to discuss his opposition to the Vietnam War. He explains why, in his view, it can be justified to refuse to obey state authorities. A state, after all, can declare something legal and still commit an injustice. If it wages an unjust war, people must be able to resist it, even if doing so means breaking the law. The publication of the Pentagon Papers in the summer of 1971 had just demonstrated how a government could attempt to use legal means to prevent its own deceptions from being exposed.
But this raises a difficult question: By what standard can we decide that a law is unjust? Chomsky considers the distinction between legality and justice indispensable. We do not need to know what a perfectly just society would look like in order to distinguish between better and worse social conditions. No one needs a complete philosophical theory to recognize torture or arbitrary imprisonment as unjust. And the fact that our moral standards may be fallible does not mean that we must abandon all judgment. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain why social change should be desirable at all.
Foucault sees things differently. What a society calls justice is, for him, itself the result of a particular history. Courts, laws, and punishments have by no means always served only to protect people; they have also helped preserve existing relations of power. Of course, the oppressed can invoke justice in their struggle against their oppressors. But for Foucault, this demonstrates precisely that the concept is used within social conflicts and does not simply stand above them.
Here lies the decisive difference: Chomsky is looking for a standard by which power can be criticized. Foucault reminds us that this very standard has emerged within particular historical relations of power. What one man needs as the foundation of political criticism, the other regards as something that must itself be subjected to criticism.
The Price of Victory
The conflict intensifies when Foucault speaks about the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. The working class, he argues, does not fight against its rulers because it has first discovered a universally valid idea of justice that legitimizes its struggle. It fights to break the power of the ruling class. One wages war in order to win, not because the war is just.
Chomsky strongly disagrees. What, he asks, if the working class were to establish a terrorist police state after its victory, one in which freedom and human dignity were destroyed just as they had been under the old regime? Could such a revolution be supported simply because it had removed the previous rulers? For Chomsky, the answer is clear: victory by an oppressed class is not in itself progress. What matters is whether it actually produces a freer and more just society.
Foucault responds that overcoming class domination may, in certain circumstances, require violence against those who seek to regain their former power. Chomsky does not deny that violence can sometimes be justified; he is not an absolute pacifist. Nevertheless, its justification must depend on whether it can genuinely lead to better social conditions. Otherwise, any atrocity could be excused on the grounds that it serves the victory of one's own side. For Chomsky, success alone cannot constitute a moral argument.
Two different fears now come into view. Chomsky fears a politics in which power takes the place of justice and a revolution merely produces a new set of rulers. Foucault, by contrast, fears that supposedly universal ideals will quietly perpetuate the assumptions of the old society. How can a revolution bring about something genuinely new if its goals are determined from the outset by concepts inherited from the very order it seeks to overcome?
Both positions, however, have their difficulties. Chomsky must be able to explain what his conception of justice rests upon. He himself acknowledges that he cannot establish its ultimate foundation with certainty. Nevertheless, he maintains that there are fundamental human needs, such as freedom, solidarity, and a life worthy of human dignity, from which moral standards can be developed. Without such a foundation, he believes, it would be difficult to distinguish liberation from a new form of oppression.
Foucault, in turn, must face the question of what social criticism can still appeal to if its moral concepts are also shaped by existing relations of power. The fact that an idea of justice has emerged historically does not necessarily mean that it is false or useless. Perhaps a concept can be turned against the very domination it once served to justify. Foucault does not, however, offer a definitive answer to this difficulty that evening.
We can now see why the two men, despite their shared political convictions, arrive at such different conclusions. Chomsky needs the idea of human nature to explain the standards by which a better society might be judged. Foucault doubts that our conceptions of humanity and justice can ever be independent of the history in which they emerged. Both want to prevent liberation from turning into a new form of oppression. But they see the danger in different places.
Two Minutes of Justice
The conversation would later become one of the best-known philosophical television debates of the twentieth century. Yet even the history of its transmission contains a remarkable irony. Chomsky speaks English during the discussion, Foucault French. The English transcript published later was not simply translated word for word, but edited and abridged in various places. As the translation scholar Sean Cotter has shown, these interventions sometimes even alter the apparent course of the argument.
At one point, Foucault explicitly contrasts la guerre and la justice in the French original. In the published English version, however, la guerre becomes social struggle. Chomsky responds with a remark about the war, a direct response to Foucault's original wording. A reader familiar only with the English version, by contrast, might get the impression that Chomsky has abruptly changed the subject. The translation thus makes the conversation seem less coherent in places than it actually was. In the surviving English version, the two philosophers sometimes appear to talk past one another more than they did in the original encounter.
There is something peculiarly fitting about this in a discussion concerned with the very conditions of our thinking: the debate itself is not independent of the linguistic and historical circumstances through which it has come down to us. Which words we read and how we understand the arguments depend in part on decisions made only after the conversation had ended.
Towards the end of the discussion, Foucault wants to respond to Chomsky's arguments once more, at greater length. He asks Elders how much time he has left. Two minutes, the moderator replies. Foucault laughs and protests that this is unfair, prompting Chomsky and the audience to laugh as well.
It is an almost perfect punchline. The very philosopher who has just questioned the idea of universally valid justice now appeals to it himself. Of course, this does not refute his position. Foucault never claimed that the concept of justice could not be used. Rather, he wanted to show that our moral convictions, too, have a history from which we cannot simply detach ourselves.
Perhaps this is where the lasting significance of this unusual encounter lies. Chomsky reminds us that social criticism needs a standard by which existing conditions can be judged. Foucault shows why that standard itself must continually be questioned. We cannot imagine a better world without drawing on concepts familiar to us from our own. But neither can we simply give up trying to think beyond them.
The two tunnel diggers did not meet that evening. Yet from opposite sides, they exposed the same difficulty: How can we change a society when even our idea of what would be better might still be shaped by the very society we wish to overcome?